in the proposal.. this part... For example, if Abracadabra creates MIM-FBP metapool with TVL of $500m, that is ~$250m of FBP growth it subsidizes. Because the Curve AMO can mint FRAX into the FRAXBP pool to balance this new demand, it will earn more CRV+CVX+fees due to the MIM-FBP metapool. FRAX can then distribute the revenue it generated back to Abracadabra through veCRV+vlCVX incentives the MIM-FBP pool in the next voting period essentially returning value back to any project that pairs with FBP proportional to its size.... Does this mean that you will vote for the pools paired with frax and bribe vlcvx holders as well? There was a typo in that sentence so I wasn't sure?
Yes, it would mean that the amount of revenue the Curve AMO earns because of the increase in demand from FBP would be distributed back to the project that paired with FBP in the next voting round. So they get back the amount of demand they create 🙂
So is this via bribes mechanism?
Yes it will go back to more yield for their own pool. Basically another way to look at it is that FBP distributes the cash flows and yield back to the project rather than projects subsidizing the TVL of the base pool without being able to capture any value.
I think i just had an aha moment.. tell me if i have this right, instead of protocols bribing for liquidity to their respective pools, which I'm sure will still happen, protocols that pair with the frax basepool earn the fees and bribes. Protocols don't need to bribe If they pair with frax basepool. The fees and bribes come back to them.
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