have to surrender a portion of their fees to BNT LPs (which would disincentivise being a TKN LP even further)? Or would fees be increased overall so as not to eat into TKN LPs share (which would make Bancor an even less viable trading solution)? In either case, it kind of further discourages the concept of any new TKN liquidity entering (although you could argue that the design has done a pretty good job of that already), and lack of TKN liquidity really is the key limiting factor to any other solutions or benefits currently proposed.
If all solutions are built around benefitting BNT LPs over TKN LPs, then they better damn set aside some some special TKN LP-exclusive rewards for when the deficit is reduced, because they're the ones who've been screwed over the most, and now are expected to sacrifice more in order to benefit the protocol 🤷🏻
I would probably have a secondary TKN reward pool that BNT rewards could get access to by staking BNT.
Having the BNT price go up benefits TKN lp because it reduces the deficit.
But those TKN rewards would have to come from somewhere, so either you keep the same fees and take away from the TKN LPs (which just screws them over even more and further breaks trust in the protocol), or you increase the fees to fund that new reward pool, and it makes Bancor an even less competitive platform (and also weakens value proposition towards TKN LPs). Like I said, if there's anything remotely like that, there better be a huge "only for TKN LPs" compensation fund when deficit gets reduced, otherwise such a proposal would only further showcase the lack of concern for TKN LPs within the system The price of BNT going up is beneficial yes, but there are ways to increase the price or reduce the deficit without giving extra rewards to those who suffered least from the reversal of the full ILP proposition, and/or asking those who've been affected the most by the protocol's flaws to pay for new benefits to those who've already been heavily favoured throughout protocol design. It just so happens that we're currently in a state where recognising that an entity like the foundation could immediately remediate the deficit brings out a load of semantic smokescreens.
I also sort of think TKN fee rewards, while in deficit, should be capped at a certain percentage and anything over that would go to the protocol to reduce the deficit.
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